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This paper analyses the operational integration between different multimodal transport 
services and proposes a slot allocation and pricing model for multimodal transport networks 
to maximize revenue and utilize capacity. The methodology entails a revenue-based 
optimal two-stage approach. Firstly, a slot allocation model is formulated by using 
stochastic integer programming for long-term contract market sale where the 
predetermined or negotiated price tariffs are used for regular orders. Secondly, a stochastic 
nonlinear programming is formulated to solve the slot allocation and dynamic pricing on 
short-term spot market sale for temporal as well as last-minute orders. Finally, a case 




The changing structure of the transport business driven by high cost efficiency, increased 
competition, demand pressure, less pollution, strict traffic and customs regulations has led 
shippers to immediately use multimodal freight transport services (Kayikci, 2014). The one 
hand, shippers seek the cost efficient, quality effective and faster services, on the other 
hand multimodal transport service providers (MTPs) offer the services timely and faster 
with appropriate slot allocation and pricing strategy in order to maximize revenue. 
Multimodal transport describes a multi-unit transport chain in which transport are conveyed 
with at least two different transport modes (i.e. rail-road, river-road, sea-road, sea-rail) 
on the basis of a multimodal transport contract from a place (origin) in one country at 
which transport units are taken in charge by the multimodal transport providers in 
transport means (e.g. RoRo vessel, RoLa train) to a designated place (destination) for 
delivery in a different country (UN, 1980). A typical transport chain consists of three 
separated segments: pre-haulage, main-haulage and end-haulage. The sections for pre- 
and end-haulage refer short-distance and transport units (e.g. RoRo-units, containers, 
trailers) are mostly transported by road between customers and terminals/ports and vice 
versa, while main-haulage refers long-distance and transport units are shipped by vessels 
from one port to another and/or transported by rail from one terminal to another. Main-
haulage consists of the combination of several sea-rail connections or modal shifts 
(transshipments), where MTPs establish often a consortium (e.g. liner shipping provider, 
railway freight provider) and this is responsible for the performance of entire haulage 
contract from origin to destination (OD) and also capacity management of transport 
means. Also, an MTP, which is mainly liner shipping provider, can rent block train services 
as a company train rather than using public train services of other railway freight providers 
and it offers a seamless trip between OD to the shippers by taking the whole trip 
responsibility. Block train enables MTPs that all storage units are shipped from the same 
point and arrive at the same destination, so that trip can be realized without having any 
transshipment within OD, uninterrupted and faster. This research focuses on the main-
haulage part of transport network. 
 
The development of the multimodal transport system relies on the construction of 
networked comprehensive cargo hub (multimodal hub) system. These cargo hubs provide 
transport mode transfer for the multimodal transport services. They usually have stockyard 
for stacking transport units, as well as dispatching and configuration of freight trains, 
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vessels or vehicles. Meanwhile, they have good highway connections, railway facilities, 
seaport and well-tuned information systems, which are essential for the freight transport 
services and helpful for tracking, managing and controlling the freight flow (Lowe, 2005). 
Beside this, the capacity management including route planning and vessel/train scheduling 
is likely to be a crucial success factor for the sustainability of multimodal transport (Kayikci, 
2014). Inadequate capacity utilization may cause dramatic losses for MTPs. Therefore, a 
high level of collaboration and seamless integration is significant. The capacity of freight 
trains and vessels is generally being utilized at a rate of over 70% per trip (Kayikci, 2014). 
In this respect, revenue management (RM) strategies and technologies may help MTPs to 
improve load factor (capacity utilization rate) and margins of their services. 
 
The context of multimodal freight transport has been extensively studied in literature 
(SteadieSeifi, et al. 2014). A large number of research efforts have been focused on 
transport planning problems at the strategic, tactical and operational decision-making 
levels. However, a successful implementation of multimodal freight transport and also 
other innovative transport solutions not only depend on efficient transport planning and 
control, but also on an appropriate slot allocation and pricing strategy for multimodal 
freight services (Li et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2012; Tao, 2013). In the multimodal transport 
industry, like in airline industry, in practice there are two different as well as related 
components of multimodal transport revenue maximization (Belobaba et al., 2009): 
differential pricing: various VKLSSHUSURGXFWV³fare products´ are offered at different price 
categories (dynamic or fixed price options) with different characteristics for freight 
transport in the same OD route; revenue management: This process determines the 
number of slots (space occupied by a transport unit in a vessel or a train) to be made 
available to each VKLSSHUFODVV³IDUHFODVV´IRUERRNLQJDVORWRQDWUDQVSRUWPHDQVE\
setting booking limits (capacity control) on fare slots. The pricing strategy has a great 
impact on the profitability as well competitiveness of multimodal freight services and also 
it plays an important role for the shippers to decide on transport mode. A pricing strategy 
based on a single price for all available slots is an imperfect compromise to maximize 
revenue, therefore the price segmentation should be applied. A pricing strategy depends 
mainly on transport cost, price sensitivity, and competition (Reis et al., 2013; Li et al., 
2010), but also there are many factors for pricing multimodal freight transport involved in 
determining how much shippers should be charged by using each service with specific 
service-related characteristics such as origin node (loading), destination node 
(discharging), type of transport means, the number and type of transport units, transport 
time, delivery time and also time of reservation. Usually one or more of these factors vary 
significantly across market segments. The purpose of this research is to present a dynamic 
slot allocation and pricing framework for MTPs which operate together. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, a revenue-based slot allocation and 
pricing model is described, then the solution model is developed, afterwards a case study 
is applied into the model, finally the paper is completed with findings and conclusion.  
 
A REVENUE-BASED SLOT ALLOCATION AND PRICING MODEL 
 
A revenue-based slot allocation and pricing model is depicted in Figure 1. This model solely 
considers sea and rail transport in a multimodal transport network, whereas road transport 
is kept out of the model. Although in the practice the pricing strategies for each transport 
mode are mainly determined as fixed pricing according to km-distance to be travelled 
between OD, in this model, we used shipper classes in order to determine pricing 
strategies. Three shipper classes are identified, namely (Kayikci, 2014): (1) contractual 
shipper regularly ships large quantities of transport units and is characterized with a fixed-
commitment contract and negotiated market price; a certain slot allotment (protect slots) 
is reserved on transport means over a period of time where the orders of major shippers 
and forwarders have priority to get fulfilled (Lee, et al, 2007). (2) ad-hoc shipper buys slot 
with spot market price; this type of shippers is temporal and this fare is offered only for a 
certain sales time period (i.e. until one-two weeks before the departure date of vessel or 
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train). (3) urgent shipper typically seeks a free slot in the last minute and is willing to pay 
a high fare for the last-minute freight services. The highest spot market rate in the sales 
time period is preferably allocated to the urgent shippers. The contractual shippers make 
an agreement with consortia on the number of shipped transport units per year, therefore 
there are protected slots at each vessel and rail to reserve for contract market sale. Since 
the ad-hoc and urgent orders generates higher revenue, it is optimal to accept as many 
orders for spot market sale as possible (Lee, et al. 2007). Because of this predictable 
behaviour, the freight demand of contractual shipper is certain, whereas the demand is 
uncertain for urgent and ad-hoc shippers. The price strategy depends on the relationship 
between the supply capacity (the number of available slots) and demand forecast (number 
of shipper orders). If the demand is greater than the supply, there is a shortage. If the 
supply increases, the price decreases, and if the supply decreases, the price increases. 
 
 
Figure 1: A revenue-based slot allocation and pricing model in multimodal transport 
The total shared slot capacity indicates the total available slots on transport units, e.g. on 
both train and vessel. Operationally, capacity of transport units depends on the density of 
booked shipments and their shapes as well as the dead weight restriction. Also, the 
transport unit mix in relation to movable decks, internal ramps, lane heights etc., can be 
a limiting factor as to how much cargo in a vessel or train wagon can accommodated. In 
the model, it is also necessary to determine how much slot capacity should be allocated to 
the contractual shippers for contract market sale. For that the MTPs make decision on the 
limitation of allotments, as this would affect also the profitability. The seasonality of cargo 
movements (peak and low season), directional cargo imbalances (import vs. export), 
minimum scale (the number and size of vessels and/or trains) and so on play important 




The methodology entails a revenue based optimal two-stage approach. Firstly, a slot 
allocation model is formulated by using stochastic integer programming for long-term 
contract market where the pre-determined price tariffs are used for regular customer class. 
Secondly, a stochastic nonlinear programming is formulated to solve the slot allocation and 
dynamic pricing for spot market. 
 
Assumptions: 
Supply capacity for shared slots and demand forecasts are equal. 
All transhipments are loaded freights.  
Only semi-trailers are shipped as transport unit. 
All trips which made either vessels or rails are round trips, different prices can be assigned 
for every OD direction due to importing/exporting freight. The freight rate is calculated 
according to combined sea-rail legs, there is no separate calculation. 
There is no additional cargo demand (semi-trailer) available for loading from the cargo-
hub ሺܪሻ to vessel and train. 
The average freight rate of each OD node pair for contractual shippers is determined in 
advanced on negotiation. 
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There are no cancellations and no-shows. 
 
Indices and parameters: ݅ = the index of loading node (origin node) of the freight flow, ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ݉ ݆ = the index of discharging node (destination node) of the freight flow, ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ ܸ= the index of nodes for seaport terminal, ܸ ൌ ሼݒ௜ȁ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሽ ܴ= the index of nodes for railway inland terminal, ܴ ൌ ሼݎ௝ȁ݆ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሽ ܧ= the edge from/to OD pair, ܧ ൌ ሼ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯Ȁ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯ȁݒ௜ א ܸǡ ݎ௝ א ܴሽ ݇= the index of trip for vessel or train, ݇ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ݈. Each trip is constrained by the maximum 
serviceable capacity ܳ = the total slot capacity of multimodal line, ܳ ൌ ܳ௩ ൅ ܳ௥ ܳ௩ = the slot capacity of vessel ܳ௥ = the slot capacity of train ܳ௞௩ and ܳ௞௥ = the available slot capacity of ݇௧௛ trip for vessel or train ܯܣ = the maximum slot allotment of contractual shippers (protect slots) ݌௜௝௖  and ݌௝௜௖  = slot price for contractual shippers at theݐ௧௛ booking period of contract market 
sale from/to OD pair respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯ ௜ܲ௝௧௦௨ and ௝ܲ௜௧௦௨ = upper price limit at the ݐ௧௛ booking period of spot market sales from/to OD 
pair respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯ ௜ܲ௝௧௦௟  and ௝ܲ௜௧௦௟  = lower price limit at the ݐ௧௛ booking period of spot market sales from/to OD 
pair respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯ ݌௜௝௧௦  and ݌௝௜௧௦  = slot price at theݐ௧௛ booking period of spot market sales from/to OD pair 
respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯, where the slot price for ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ െͳ is allocated for ad-hoc shippers, whereas ݐ ൌ ܶ for urgent shippers  ܶ = booking period for spot market sales, ݐ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ െ ͳǡ ܶ, which can be divided into the 
sub-periods e.g. days, weeks. 
 
Decision variables: ݔ௜௝௖  and ݔ௝௜௖  = slot demand for contractual shippers at theݐ௧௛ booking period of contract 
market sale from/to OD pair respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯. ݔ௜௝௧௦  and ݔ௝௜௧௦  = slot demand at theݐ௧௛ booking period of spot market sale from/to OD pair 
respectively for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯, where the slot demand for ݐ ൌͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܶ െ ͳ is allocated for ad-hoc shippers, whereas ݐ ൌ ܶ for urgent shippers. 
We assumed that the demand function is linear ݔ௜௝௧௦ ൌܽ௜௝௧ െ ܾ௜௝௧ Ǥ ݌௜௝௧௦ ǡ ܽ௜௝௧ ǡ ܾ௜௝௧ ൐ Ͳǡ ׊ݐ and ݔ௝௜௧௦ ൌ௝ܽ௜௧ െ ௝ܾ௜௧ Ǥ ݌௝௜௧௦ , ௝ܽ௜௧ ǡ ܾ௝௜௧ ൐ Ͳǡ ׊ݐǡwhere the demand function coefficients, ܽ and ܾ are estimated 
for eachݐ௧௛ booking period using statistical methods (e.g. regression analysis) for round-
trip (Thiele, 2006). The demand in spot market is uncertain and fluctuated randomly, 
therefore dynamic price need to be included. Actual value of demand function coefficients ܽ௜௝௧ and ܾ௜௝௧ is denoted with ෤ܽ௜௝௧ and ෨ܾ௜௝௧ for OD pair as to outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯, ෤ܽ௜௝௧ א ሾܽ௜௝௧ െ ොܽ௜௝௧ ǡ ܽ௜௝௧ ൅ ොܽ௜௝௧ሿ, ෨ܾ௜௝௧ א ሾܾ௜௝௧ െ ෠ܾ௜௝௧ ǡ ܾ௜௝௧ ൅ ෠ܾ௜௝௧ሿ sowie ෤ܽ௝௜௧ א ሾ ௝ܽ௜௧ െ ොܽ௝௜௧ ǡ ௝ܽ௜௧ ൅ ොܽ௝௜௧ሿ, ෨ܾ௝௜௧ א ሾ ௝ܾ௜௧ െ ෠ܾ௝௜௧ ǡ ௝ܾ௜௧ ൅ ෠ܾ௝௜௧ሿ, where ොܽ and ෠ܾ indicate the variation in coefficients. Deviation 
degrees for ߙ௜௝௧ ǡ ߚ௜௝௧ א ሾെͳǡͳሿbetween the actual value ෤ܽ௜௝௧ȁ ෨ܾ௜௝௧ and the estimated value ܽ௜௝௧ȁܾ௜௝௧are included, which makes ෤ܽ௜௝௧ ൌ ܽ௜௝௧ ൅ ොܽ௜௝௧ߙ௜௝௧ ǡ ෨ܾ௜௝௧ ൌ ܾ௜௝௧ ൅ ෠ܾ௜௝௧ߚ௜௝௧. The absolute value 
of the differences between actual and nominal demand at the ݐ௧௛ booking period is ߬௜௝௧௦ ൌ ොܽ௜௝௧ߙ௜௝௧ െ ෠ܾ௜௝௧ߚ௜௝௧ Ǥ ݌௜௝௧௦  for outward trip ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯, similar ௝߬௜௧௦ ൌ ොܽ௝௜௧ߙ௝௜௧ െ ෠ܾ௝௜௧ߚ௝௜௧ Ǥ ݌௝௜௧௦ for return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯. The lesser the ߬ value, the higher the demand function involvement from MTPs. This  ߬ is added in the objective function for spot market sale. ௜ܸ௝௞௖  = trip length; ௜ܸ௝௞௖ ൌ ͳ, if vessel trip k is the part of OD pair for outward trip ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ in 
contractual market sale, otherwise ௜ܸ௝௞௖ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ௝ܸ௜௞௖  = trip length; ௝ܸ௜௞௖ ൌ ͳ, if vessel trip k is the part of OD pair for return trip ൫ݎ௝ ǡ ݒ௜൯ in 
contractual market sale, otherwise ௝ܸ௜௞௖ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ܴ௜௝௞௖  = trip length; ܴ௜௝௞௖ ൌ ͳ, if rail trip k is the part of OD pair for outward trip ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ in 
contractual market sale, otherwise ܴ௜௝௞௖ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. 
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௝ܴ௜௞௖  = trip length; ௝ܴ௜௞௖ ൌ ͳ, if rail trip k is the part of OD pair for return trip ൫ݎ௝ ǡ ݒ௜൯ in 
contractual market sale, otherwise ௝ܴ௜௞௖ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ௜ܸ௝௞௦ = trip length; ௜ܸ௝௞௦ ൌ ͳ, if vessel trip k is the part of OD pair for outward trip ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ in spot 
market sale, otherwise ௜ܸ௝௞௦ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ௝ܸ௜௞௦  = trip length; ௝ܸ௜௞௦ ൌ ͳ, if vessel trip k is the part of OD pair for return trip ൫ݎ௝ ǡ ݒ௜൯ in spot 
market sale, otherwise ௝ܸ௜௞௦ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ܴ௜௝௞௦  = trip length; ܴ௜௝௞௦ ൌ ͳ, if rail trip k is the part of OD pair for outward trip ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ in spot 
market sale, otherwise ܴ௜௝௞௦ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. ௝ܴ௜௞௦  = trip length; ௝ܴ௜௞௦ ൌ ͳ, if rail trip k is the part of OD pair for return trip ൫ݎ௝ ǡ ݒ௜൯ in spot 
market sale, otherwise ௝ܴ௜௞௦ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇. 
 
Objective functions 
The objective function of the model is to maximize the total freight contribution for contract 
and spot market sale.  ܯܽݔܼ ൌ ܯܽݔܼሺܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሻ ൅ ܯܽݔܼሺݏ݌݋ݐሻሺͳሻ 
Contract market sale: The objective function of the model for contract market sale is to 
maximize the total freight contribution from the shipment of contractual shippers for round 
trip. This is represented in equation (2). ܯܽݔܼሺܿ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐሻ ൌ ෍෍݌௜௝௖ Ǥ ݔ௜௝௖௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൅෍෍݌௝௜௖ Ǥ ݔ௝௜௖௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ሺʹሻ 
Spot market sale: The objective function of the model for spot market sale is to total freight 
contribution from the shipment of ad-hoc shippers as well as urgent shippers. This is 
represented in equation (3). ܯܽݔܼሺݏ݌݋ݐሻ ൌ ෍෍෍݌௜௝௧௦ Ǥ ݔ௜௝௧௦்ିଵ௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൅෍෍෍݌௝௜௧௦ Ǥ ݔ௝௜௧௦்ିଵ௧ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ൅෍෍ ෍ ݌௜௝௧௦ Ǥ ݔ௜௝௧௦்௧ୀ்ିଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൅෍෍ ෍ ݌௝௜௧௦ Ǥ ݔ௝௜௧௦்௧ୀ்ିଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ሺ͵ሻ ܯܽݔܼሺݏ݌݋ݐሻ ൌ ሺ෍෍෍݌௜௝௧௦ ൫ܽ௜௝௧ െ ܾ௜௝௧ Ǥ ݌௜௝௧௦ ൯ ൅ ෍෍෍݌௜௝௧௦ ൫ ොܽ௜௝௧ߙ௜௝௧ െ ෠ܾ௜௝௧ߚ௜௝௧ Ǥ ݌௜௝௧௦ ൯்ିଵ௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ሻ௠௜ୀଵ்ିଵ௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൅ڮ 
Constraints: 
(a) Vessel constraints: ෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௖௟௞ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ௜ܸ௝௞௖ ൅෍෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௧௦ ௜ܸ௝௞௖௟௞ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൑ ෍ܳ௞௩௟௞ୀଵ ൌ ܳ௩ ǡ ׊݇ሺͶሻ 
෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௖௟௞ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ௝ܸ௜௞௖ ൅෍෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௧௦ ௝ܸ௜௞௖௟௞ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ൑ ෍ܳ௞௩௟௞ୀଵ ൌܳ௩ ǡ ׊݇ሺͷሻ 
෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௖௟௞ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ௜ܸ௝௞௖ ܽ݊݀෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௖௟௞ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ௝ܸ௜௞௖ ൑ ܯܣሺ͸ሻ 
(b) Train constraints: ෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௖௟௞ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ܴ௜௝௞௖ ൅෍෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௧௦ ܴ௜௝௞௖௟௞ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൑ ෍ܳ௞௥௟௞ୀଵ ൌ ܳ௥ ǡ ׊݇ሺ͹ሻ 
෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௖௟௞ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ௝ܴ௜௞௖ ൅෍෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௧௦ ௝ܴ௜௞௖௟௞ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ൑ ෍ܳ௞௥௟௞ୀଵ ൌܳ௥ ǡ ׊݇ሺͺሻ 
෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௖௟௞ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ܴ௜௝௞௖ ܽ݊݀෍෍෍ݔ௝௜௖௟௞ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ ௝ܴ௜௞௖ ൑ ܯܣሺͻሻ 
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(c) Total slot capacity constraint for multimodal freight transport: 
The total allocated slot number for contract and slot market sale cannot exceed the total 
slot capacity of multimodal freight transport, as shown in equation (10), total slot capacity 
is the sum of the available shared capacity of the total vessel operational capacity and train 
operational capacity, seen in equation (11). ෍෍ݔ௜௝௖௡௝ୀଵ ൅௠௜ୀଵ ෍෍෍ݔ௜௝௧௦்௧ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ௠௜ୀଵ ൑ ܳሺͳͲሻ ܳ ൌ ෍ܳ௞௩௟௞ୀଵ ൅෍ܳ௞௥௟௞ୀଵ ሺͳͳሻ 
 
(d) Freight demand constraint: 
The allocated slots to each OD leg must be set between the interval of the lower and upper 
bound of freight price at the ݐ௧௛ booking period of spot market sales for outward ൫ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝൯ and 
return trip ൫ݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝൯ respectively, seen in equation (12) and (13). The price for spot market 
sale cannot be lower than the price for contact market sale. This also helps to keep the 




An Istanbul based consortium of MTPs provides a number of sea and rail transport services 
to shippers and has a fixed transport capacity on each link of the multimodal network. 
Shippers search slots for semi-trailers to reserve available space on vessel and rail. MTPs 
allocate shared slots capacity for the three classes of shippers with three legs from Istanbul ሺݒͳሻ to Salzburg ሺݎͳሻ and Ludwigshafen ሺݎʹሻ through sea-rail transhipment. Transshipment 
takes place in Trieste ሺܪሻ.  
 
 
Figure 2: The multimodal freight transport network 
The multimodal transport network is arranged in several railway legs and sea shipping 
voyages as shown in Figure 2. This network can be defined through a graph, i.e. ܯ ൌሺܪǡ ܸǡ ܴǡ ܧሻ that models the network structure, where ܸ  is a set of nodes for seaport terminal, ܸ ൌ ሼݒ௜ȁ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሽ, ܴ is a set of nodes for railway inland terminal (hinterland), ܴ ൌ ሼݎ௝ȁ݆ ൌͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሽ and ܪ denotes the cargo hub for multimodal transport where both loading and 
discharging operations of vessels and trains are carried out. In a multimodal transport 
network, many cargo hubs can be operated for modal shift. A combination of one railway 
node and one sea shipping node refers an OD pair of multimodal freight flow which is 
shown with edge ܧ ൌ ሼሺݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝ሻȁݒ௜ א ܸǡ ݎ௝ א ܴሽ. Railway freight provider operates rail services 
(i.e. RoLa, ISU) to/from the ports/terminals, which are specially designed wagons to carry 
wheeled cargo by rail. Liner shipping provider has a fleet of vessels (i.e. RoRo), which are 
specially types of ships designed to carry wheeled cargo. Their transport units can be 
trucks, semi-trailer trucks, trailers, automobiles, railroad cars, project cargo, and maritime 
containers on MAFIs or cassettes. The railway freight provider operates round-trip daily 
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RoLa train service with six/leg from cargo hub to two railway inland terminals ሺܪ െ ݎ െ ܪሻ. 
The train capacity (ܳ௞௥) is 32 semi-trailers/trip. The liner shipping provider operates round-
trip daily RoRo vessel service with one/line from seaport to cargo hub ሺݒ െ ܪ െ ݒሻ. The 
vessel capacity (ܳ௞௩) is 240 semi-trailers/trip. The maximum shared capacity from one port 
to other terminal for each trip is 192 and each trip is completed via sea and rail transport. 
There is one sea trip and four rail trips between ሺݒͳ െݎͳሻ, whereas there is one sea trip and 
two rail trip between ሺݒଵ െݎଶሻ for both outward and return legs. 
 
Booking periods of spot market sale OD ݐ ൌ ͳ ݐ ൌ ʹ ݐ ൌ ͵ 
Estimation of demand function 
coefficients ܽ௜௝௧ and ܾ௜௝௧ for outward trip ݒଵ െݎଵ 150, 0.053 85, 0.022 33, 0.013 ݒଵ െݎଶ 90, 0.047 45, 0.015 20, 0.008 
Variation of demand function coefficients ොܽ௜௝௧ and ෠ܾ௜௝௧ for outward trip ݒଵ െݎଵ 15, 0.005 15, 0.005 15, 0.005 ݒଵ െݎଶ 10, 0.005 10, 0.005 10, 0.005 
Estimation of demand function 
coefficients ௝ܽ௜௧ and ௝ܾ௜௧ for return trip ݎଵെݒଵ 130, 0.048 102, 0.019 21, 0.008 ݎଶെݒଵ 53, 0.041 28, 0.016 13, 0.006 
Variation of demand function coefficients ොܽ௜௝௧ and ෠ܾ௜௝௧ for return trip ݎଵെݒଵ 15, 0.005 15, 0.005 15, 0.005 ݎଶെݒଵ 10, 0.005 10, 0.005 10, 0.005 
Table 1: Estimation and variation of demand function coefficients in booking periods 
Node Pair 
(ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝ሻሺݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝) contractual shipper  (no ݐ limitation) ad-hoc shipper  (ݐ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܶ െ ͳሻ urgent shipper  (ݐ ൌ ܶሻ 
time period ݐ ൌ ܱ ݐ ൌ ͳ ݐ ൌ ʹ ݐ ൌ ͵ 
OD Price Demand Price Demand Price Demand Price Demand ݒଵ െݎଵ 1628 40 1863 68 1900 13 2023 7 ݒଵ െݎଶ 1488 13 1813 42 1928 7 1968 2 ݎଵെݒଵ 1628 35 1948 71 2030 18 2115 4 ݎଶെݒଵ 1488 18 1898 34 1998 8 2061 4 
Revenue ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼ 
Total ¼ 
The transport unit price of semi-trailer is in Euro. Maximum allotment for contract market sale is 30%. Trip 
capacity is 100%. 
Table 2: Differentiated scenario: slot allocation and pricing strategy according to dynamic 
pricing conditions in booking period ݐ 
Node Pair 
(ݒ௜ ǡ ݎ௝ሻሺݎ௜ ǡ ݒ௝) contractual shipper  (no ݐ limitation) ad-hoc shipper  (ݐ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܶ െ ͳሻ urgent shipper  (ݐ ൌ ܶሻ 
time period ݐ ൌ ܱ ݐ ൌ ͳ ݐ ൌ ʹ ݐ ൌ ͵ 
OD Price Demand Price Demand Price Demand Price Demand ݒଵ െݎଵ 1628 40 1863 68 1863 13 1863 7 ݒଵ െݎଶ 1488 13 1813 42 1813 7 1813 2 ݎଵെݒଵ 1628 35 1948 71 1948 18 1948 4 ݎଶെݒଵ 1488 18 1898 34 1898 8 1898 4 
Revenue ¼ ¼ ¼87.158 ¼2.051 
Total ¼3.107 
Table 3: Basic scenario: Slot allocation and pricing strategy according to same price 
conditions in booking period ݐ 
It is assumed that the booking period of spot market sale is divided into three average 
time periods ݐ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ͵, where ݐ ൌ ͵ represents the greatest time period of booking and offers 
higher prices for urgent shipper. The demand function coefficients for estimation and 
variation are determined via using statistical analysis, seen in Table1. The optimization 
software LINGO 14.0 is used to solve the model. The maximum allotment ሺܯܣሻ for contract 
market sale is kept around 30%, where fixed prices are used for the booking orders of 
contractual shippers. These shippers have a long term contractual agreement with MTPs 
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to secure the reservation priority. The rest of slot capacity are allocated according to 
dynamic pricing strategy. The lowest and highest prices ( ௜ܲ௝௧௦௟ ǡ ௜ܲ௝௧௦௨ ǡ ௝ܲ௜௧௦௟ ǡ ௝ܲ௜௧௦௨ሻper outward and 
return trip are calculated according to Equation (3) seen in Table 2, here the value of 
dynamic price rates should be higher than the rates of contractual shipper.  
 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The model is run by using LINGO software, which obtains the total revenue data from 
operated routes. According to differentiated pricing scenario, seen in Table 2, the price and 
demand are allocated and the WRWDOUHYHQXHLVFDOFXODWHGDV¼699.419. Table 3 shows the 
basic scenario, where the same pricing strategy is pursued for spot market sale, so that 
WKHWRWDOUHYHQXHLVREWDLQHGDV¼The comparison of results of two tables showed 
that the total revenue for multimodal transport operations in this case will increase about 
1% by applying dynamic pricing strategy through the proposed model. This provides the 
evidence that dynamic pricing applications in multimodal freight transport will boost the 
revenue maximization and the capacity utilization. 
 
In this research, road transport is kept out of the model and the booking period of spot 
market sales is limited with three time phases. Furthermore, model included only three 
legs (one port and two hinterland terminals) in order to demonstrate the simplicity of the 
network system. An extended version of the model will map out a larger network and it 
can be expanded by applying also road transport and adding additional time phases 
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